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PHILO SOPHIA CHRISTI 
SERIES 2 VOL. 2, No.2 COPYRIGHT © 2000 
The Cosmological Argument 
A Current Bibliographical Appraisal 
W. DAVID BECK 
Department of Philosophy and Theology 
Liberty University 
Lynchburg, Virginia 
[EDITOR'S NOTE: in our recent restructuring of Phi 10 sophia Christi, we set aside the 
tradition of pub lis hing the annual presidential address. Howevel; to bring closure 
to the tradition, and with an apology for the delay, we here present the/inal address 
that was delivered at our national meeting in November 1998.} 
To begin, just a word about my topic. I intend this purely as a descrip-
tive assessment of where we are at this point in the discussion of the cos-
mological argument. I will add nothing new, but so much discussion has 
occurred over the last years, especially even the last five, that I think some 
summation and agenda-setting might be helpful. That will be my limited 
purpose in what follows. 
I should add that, due to the overwhelming amount of material, I will 
restrict my attention to the traditional fonn of the argument. Particularly, I 
will leave to others an assessment of both the Kalaam and Swinburne's 
inductive arguments. Nor will I get into the constantly increasing literature 
exegeting Thomas. 
When I first began writing, it was, significantly, twenty-five years since 
the publication of Bruce Reichenbach's The Cosmological Argument (1972). 
I think it was this event that marked the beginning of more positive evalua-
tion of the argument within broader philosophical circles. Further encour-
agement and stimulus came from the appearance, two years later, of N onn 
Geisler's Philosophy of Religion (1974). The next year saw the publication 
of William Rowe's The Cosmological Argument (1975), the culmination of 
several earlier projects. Prior to Reichenbach, the discussion had been 
largely negative, mostly based on Kantian-type objections against 
Leibniz/Clarke-type arguments. Given the general presuppositionalism, as 
well as the standard rejections of Carl Hemy and Gordon Clark, evangeli-
cals were not often on the affinnative side. There were of course among 
Christian philosophers some exceptions, like the Catholic Thomists Mascall, 
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Maritain, Copleston, Gilson, Owen, Brown, Trethowen, and others. But the 
withering barrage from the positivist and analytical camps Flew, Edwards, 
Russell, Hampshire, Nielsen, Smart, et aI., - had made it just about impos-
sible to be both an intelligent philosopher and also think that there was 
something to the cosmological argument. 
In that context, Reichenbach's The Cosmological Argument: A 
Reassessment was certainly a courageous book. As he himself notes, the 
door had been opened just a crack by the reexamination of Kant's rejection 
of the ontological argument by Malcolm, Hartshome, Hick and others. 
Certainly, the gauntlet had been laid down by rejections of the cosmological 
argument by Alston, Plantinga, and Rowe in the sixties. Nevertheless, to 
publish a full-scale defense and restatement of the argument on the meta-
physical thin ice of the early seventies still deserves our applause. 
Where are we now, at the end of the century? I will divide my remarks 
into three topics. First, I will examine the progress of the argument by look-
ing at the major categories of objections. Second, I will look at two CUlTent 
restatements and analyses of the argument itself. Finally, some comment on 
the significance of the argument is in order. This will then leave us with an 
agenda for future work. 
A. Issues and Objections 
The last thilty years have witnessed a great deal of progress 011 several 
issues related to the cosmological argument. To a large extent this has been 
dictated by the form of argument that began the discussion. Both 
Reichenbach and Rowe were interested in the Leibniz/Clarke version. 
Hence, much of the subsequent discussion has been concemed with issues 
related to the nature of necessity and the principle of sufficient reason. But 
issues related more to the Thomistic argument have been resurgent as well, 
especially those unique to the Third Way. 
1. Problems with the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
Reichenbach (1972) saw the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) as the 
linchpin in an argument of his type. The basic outline of a defense of the 
PSR had been laid out already in Rowe's (1968, 1970, 1971) earlier ariicles 
that later evolved into his own book on the argument (1975). Although there 
is no reference to Rowe, Reichenbach develops a similar response to prob-
lems with PSR, distinguishing between a strong fom1 and a weak one, and 
arguing that the weak form, that there is a sufficient reason for all contingent 
beings, is all that is needed for a successful cosmological argument. His 
defense is the same as Taylor's (1963), that any attempt to prove it would 
have to appeal to considerations less plausible than the principle itself. 
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Rowe (1975) notes that a weak PSR has never been proven false. On 
the other hand, there is no proof for it, it is not self-evident, and if it is pre-
supposed then it is not !mown to be true. Hence, the cosmological argument, 
while not a successful proof, may still be reasonable and hence of some 
value to the project of theism. 
Several lines of response have developed. Adams (1978) in his review 
of Rowe rejects the notion that a strong PSR is fatally circular. If the suffi-
cient reason for there being any positive contingent state of affairs is a free, 
hence contingent, decision on God's part, then the conjunction of the gener-
al desire and the choice of each individual instance are independent and con-
tingent, and they jointly provide a noncircular explanation. 
Smith (1995) argues that Rowe's problem only effects the conjunction 
of all possible contingents and not the issue of why there are contingents at 
all and offers a way out of circularity. 
Rowe (1997) responds to both. To Adams, his response is that the resul-
tant explanation is still contingent and hence part of the conjunction of pos-
itive contingent facts and therefore not an explanation, though in the end he 
sees a stalemate here since Adams admits its contingency but argues that in 
a conjunct explanations can be considered individually. Further, he rejects 
the principle that allows Smith to claim non-circularity. 
Ross (1980), Van Inwagen (1993) and others have argued that PSR is 
false since the second order contingent fact would have to be one of the con-
juncts of the huge conjunctive fact of all contingent facts, but could have no 
explanation. 
Vallicella (1997), however, has responded that one does not need a sec-
ond order contingent fact at all. The simple list of individual explanations 
of each conjunct is sufficient. 
To all of this Rowe (1998) has recently responded by noting that none 
of this impacts on his weak version of PSR, but leaves the circularity issue 
unresolved. 
Here clearly the conversation must continue on two fronts: first, is there 
still a viable fonn of a strong PSR that does not suffer from circularity, and 
second, is the weaker version really strong enough to give us any more than 
what Rowe allows, which is clearly too little for the theist? 
2. Causality Issues 
Several types of objections come under this heading. One is easily dealt 
with, and has thankfully all but disappeared from the joumal discussion, 
though it seems to live on even in philosophical circles: namely, Hume's 
rejection of causal connections which then becomes his refutation of any 
causal argument. 
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As Geisler (1974, 1988) observed, this objection is based on an unten-
able epistemic atomism. While it was popular with earlier positivists in this 
century, it has given way to more subtle though clearly related problems in 
the more recent discussion. 
Good refutations can, neveliheless, be found in Caputo (1974) and 
Campbell (1996). Overall, the best extended treatment of Hume and Kant 
in relation to the cosmological argument is found in Hughes (1995). 
The successor objection derives more from the Kantian version that 
causality resides only in the phenomenal. It appears most notably in Flew 
(1966), that explanation and cause are defined as space/time relations and 
meaningless outside that context. Matson (1967) makes a similar claim that 
space/time causes cannot yield a logically necessary conclusion. Angeles 
(1974) argues that by definition a cause is an effect, namely of a prior cause 
and therefore any notion of a first cause is contradictOly. And Le Poidevin 
(1996) still argues that causes are contingent by definition and thus a 
space/time concept. Therefore, if God is necessary he cannot be a cause, 
personal or otherwise, and if he is a cause, then he must be contingent. 
Hence, whatever the cosmological argument concludes to, it isn't God. 
Responses to this objection are really twofold. The objection has some 
merit in relation to Leibniz/Clarke, that is, contingency arguments, but it 
shows up as the problem of necessary existence and I will deal with that sep-
arately. 
For Thomistic or first cause arguments, the objection does not apply. As 
Koons (1997) remarks, it is simply not relevant to the argument since its 
premises use the concept of causality only in a space/time framework, as 
does the conclusion; however, there it is negated. Geisler (1974,1988) notes 
that this objection fails to understand the whole point of the argument. It 
demonstrates that what causes the limits of all other things must itself not be 
limited. It does not seek to provide some new concept of causal relatedness. 
Interestingly, Smari (1996) aclmowledges that this objection has no 
weight for Thomas's arguments. It occurs, he thinks, in the form of 
Hawking's idea of a singularity where/when space/time breaks down and 
hence there is no need for a creator God. Thomas, he thinks, would simply 
respond that this is an argument for a non-space/time explanation. 
In sum, it appears to me that most fonns of the objection deserve retire-
ment. There are, of course, issues for arguments that incorporate the con-
cept of necessity in the premises and they will be dealt with below. 
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3. The Problem of Bad Science 
In this categOlY I want to deal with two specific problems related to sci-
ence. One is that CUlTent science refutes the cosmological argument, the 
other that medieval science fatally damages the premises. 
It has been primarily the Kalaam argument that has had to contend with 
issues in contemporary science, especially because of its possible implica-
tions for a big bang singularity. But there are potential defeaters for the tra-
ditional fonn as well. 
A good discussion of several such issues is in Koons (1997). He notes 
that neither the indeterminism of wave collapse, the Bell inequality theo-
rems or other features of quanh1l11 mechanics pose any threat to a universal 
causality premise which typically appears in a cosmological argument. Two 
caveats: a causal view in which contingents are detem1ined, that is, necessi-
tated, or one that implies, as some statements ofPSR do, that evelY correla-
tion or co-occurrence can be explained, would nm into some difficulties 
with quanh1l11 mechanics as currently understood. 
One of the commonplaces in critiques of the argument is the contention 
that it depends on antiquated, medieval, or just plain bad science. Best 
known, and frequently deferred to, is Kenny's (1969,1979) list of scientific 
inaccuracies in the first three ways of Thomas. 
Others have picked up this objection, including some theists who accept 
other arguments. Adler (1980), for example, argues that the traditional cos-
mological argument depends on the false medieval view that continuing 
existence needs continuing causal action. Wainwright (1988) contends that 
ancient and medieval science denies the plausibility of the Thomistic argu-
ments, but that modem versions based on contingency considerations like 
Leibniz's and Clarke's, are not touched by this problem. Mackie (1988) also 
argues that Thomas's first and second arguments depend too much on anti-
quated physical theory to be of any interest. 
Responses here have been quite uniform. They all make the point that 
such objections are irrelevant, celiainly to any Thomistic argument. Davies 
(1993) notes that this is a metaphysical argument about causality and in no 
way depends on getting the actual science right. Fogelin (1990) responds 
specifically to Kenny that examples of "bad science" appear only as illus-
trations, never in the actual premises. The whole point of the argument is 
that science cannot provide satisfying explanations. 
This response to Kenny is already in Rowe (1975). Granting that 
Thomas may well be guilty of bad astronomy, Rowe argues that belief in a 
series of essentially ordered causes responsible for the present existence of 
things is entirely a result of metaphysical analysis, not scientific observation. 
In effect, then, this type of objection appears to be purely an ad 
hominem approach. No one has argued why bad illustrations should affect 
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the overall metaphysical analysis of causality in the cosmological argument. 
Absent such, I suggest that this objection be put to rest. 
4. The Conclusion Is Not God 
If Thomas had only come up with a better ending to each of the Five 
Ways! I know he meant well, but he created no end of problems. On the 
other hand, there really is little excuse for this objection anymore; neverthe-
less it is quite frequent. The best CUlTent example is Martin (1990) where I 
count it three times. 
Some rather dramatic versions are like Kaufmann's (1958) claim that 
the God of Aquinas's theology is not the God of Job, Moses, or Jesus. More 
subtle is Flew's (1966) remark that the idea of God as a logically necessary 
being is clearly not a biblical one. 
Other examples are not hard to find. Matson (1965) claims that the con-
clusion of first cause might well just be the big bang. Martin (1990) allows 
for the same conclusion to some feature ofthe universe or the universe itself. 
Another version is that the conclusion is empty. Le Poidevin (1996) 
offers the contention that "first cause" is uninfoDnative. It simply repeats 
the assertion that there is a cause, it says nothing about it, and so cannot be 
identified with God. 
Martin (1990) adds other possibilities. He thinks that the argument 
implies nothing about intelligence or knowledge, and especially nothing 
related to perfection or goodness. Thus, the conclusion does not get us 
beyond natural process, even something evil. For that matter, he alleges that 
Reichenbach, in particular, fails to rule out plurality. 
Now there is an impOltant issue here, and one that the cosmological 
argument shares with all of the others. All too often we see popular versions 
that simply overstate the conclusion. Clearly, it is important to the integrity 
of this and all of the theistic arguments that one, first, be very precise as to 
the actual content of the conclusion, and, second, be very clear to separate 
extensions of the conclusion as further arguments or implications. 
Those points have been the common response to the above objection. 
Geisler (1974, 1988) notes that the conclusion of the argument is the simple 
existence of an uncaused cause. At the same time, this concept can be 
extended by argument to demonstrate singularity, immateriality, simplicity, 
and infinity. In tum, these concepts can be extended to imply more specif-
ic attributes of God. 
Shepherd (1975), whose Shldy of the argument I think is both one of the 
finest and also most neglected, concludes to a CEB ... a cosmos-explaining-
being. Nothing more. But then he shows how to derive by further argument 
properties like perfection and creatorlsustainer. 
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Kretzmann (1996) in a study of an often overlooked version of the argu-
ment in the Summa contra Gentiles simply refers to the conclusion as alpha, 
but notes how Thomas carefully and properly extends the discussion to 
include important and identifying properties of God. 
I need to mention one related objection. Both Flew (1966) and Gale 
(1991) argue that the first cause conclusion implies that God is the cause of 
evil. In fact, for Gale, this becomes the conclusive reason for rejecting any 
cosmological argument. Gale's study is an extremely valuable addition to 
the literature that has not gotten enough attention. Several reviewers have 
examined other features of the Shldy (Helm, 1993 and Jeffrey, 1996), but not 
his discussion of the cosmological argument. Having worked his way 
around many objections, including Rowe's and Edwards's, to three appar-
ently sound versions, he then proceeds to argue that all three have impossi-
ble conclusions since each refers to an unsurpassably great being. This con-
clusion would involve its being maximally excellent in a moral sense, but in 
the section on the problem of evil he had already concluded that such a being 
is logically impossible given certain evil properties of the world. I 
I will not comment on this issue further except to note that Gale's objec-
tion is not intemal to the cosmological argument. But then that appears to 
be true of all such "the-conclusion-isn't-God" objections. While they 
remind us to be cautious about overstating the conclusion and also to point 
out the appropriate role of a cosmological argument in a cumulative case, 
they have no bearing as such on the soundness of the argument. 
5. The Problem of Uncaused Contingents 
As I understand the logic of the Thomistic argument the concept of 
necessity is derived not in the opening premises from its possibility, but as 
an extension of the conclusion based on its uncaused nature. As a result, a 
great deal hinges on the issue of whether there could be a contingent being 
that is uncaused. If so, then the conclusion to an uncaused cause in a series 
of causes gets us nowhere. 
Craighead (1975), in his rejoinder to Reichenbach (1972), asserts that a 
causeless contingent is possible. It is possible because it is conceivable. 
I In several publications subsequent to the writing of this article. Gale has accepted a com-
bination cosmological/teleological argument for a finite God that bypasses the objection trom 
evil. See. for instance, "A New Argument for the Existence of God: One that Works, Well, Sort 
Of' in The Rationality 0/ Theism. edited Godehard BrUntrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1999). 
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Mackie (1988) has a similar assessment. He claims that the principle 
that "nothing comes from nothing" is clearly not a priori and that therefore 
the existence of an uncaused being is perfectly conceivable. 
I find Shepherd (1975) especially helpful on this issue. He provides an 
extended discussion of the various definitions of contingency, noting that in 
the argument it functions not as a property of propositions but of existents. 
He finds five components: (1) dependence on God; (2) dependence on other 
existents; (3) transience; (4) lack of ontological self-sufficiency; and (5) 
capacity to arouse a sense of ontological shock. It is the last one, our intel-
lectual need to seek a final explanation of the very existence of a universe 
at all, he labels "world-contingency," which he develops and defends, espe-
cially against Nielsen's charge that this is only a culturally conditioned, 
emotional response. All of this converges on the idea that "necessity" 
refers to the property of self-sufficiency: the lack of needing explanation. 
Hence, the cosmological argument simply demands that there be a world-
explaining but itself unexplained existent. An uncaused contingent is there-
fore contradictory. 
Reichenbach (1975), in his response to Craighead (1975), noted that the 
assertion that a causeless contingent is conceivable is empty. Craighead 
gives no argument beyond the purely psychological claim. I can, in some 
sense, conceive of round squares, but that is no argument for the actual pos-
sibility of such existents. I would add that I see nothing more in Mackie's 
(1988) Humean argument either. Some notion of psychological conceiv-
ability is simply inelevant to questions of achlal possibility. 
Nonis Clarke (1988) provides a good treatment of the argument that a 
being which is self-sufficient for its own existence must therefore be infinite 
along the lines that it would otherwise have to both exist and not exist at the 
same time. Thus, the concept of a causeless contingent, again, is contradic-
tory. 
Davis (1997) notes that it is possible that there be an everlasting con-
tingent but not a causeless one. It is everlasting because God causes it 
always to exist. He concludes, "I cannot imagine a possible scenario in 
which there exists no necessary being and there does exist an everlasting 
contingent being." 
Some of this issue may well be concephlal and Adler (1980) reminds us 
that contingent is a radical notion. A contingent existent that ceases to be 
does not transmutate into some other mode of existence. Its ceasing to be, 
that is, its ontological dependency, is replaced by absolutely nothing at all. 
This is an important pari of the argument, especially the Thomistic ver-
sion. Without it, the conclusion to an uncaused cause may leave us with no 
more than an unexplained contingent, say a big bang or perhaps etemal mat-
ter. Though we should note that in first cause arguments it effects only the 
extension of the conclusion and is not an objection to the argument itself. 
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For contingency arguments like Reichenbach's it uncouples the intemal 
move from contingent existents to necessary existent and so is far more cru-
cial. 
My judgment is that so far no one has brought forward a viable form of 
this objection and that theistic responses have been sufficient. Neveliheless, 
this is a difficult metaphysical issue that deserves continued scmtiny. 
6. Existence as a Predicate 
While this issue is normally relegated to discussions of the ontological 
argument, Kenny (1979) alleges that it affects the cosmological argument as 
well. It is, he argues, a property so thin and so vague that it is largely unin-
teresting. Hence, it invalidates the argument. There can be arguments only 
in reference to the relation of propeliies to a thing, not that something just 
"is," 
The discussion in Hughes (1995) is most relevant here. The velY 
premise of his study is that one must clarify the concept of existence before 
one can move on to the extensions ofthe cosmological argument such as sin-
gularity and simplicity. 
Existence as the propeliy relevant to the cosmological argument is the 
capacity to enter into causal relations. This is certainly not an uninteresting 
property. It distinguishes for example between the number two and the 
Eiffel Tower. If one adds modal qualifiers like contingent and necessary, 
one has even more interesting properties. Necessary existence, for exam-
ple, can be defined as the property of being "unable to cease to be capable 
of entering into causal relations." 
It seems clear to me that Kenny and others are simply wrong here to 
think that "is" can function only as an empty tenl1 between subjects and 
predicates. It can also indicate an interesting property. 
7. Are Infinite Regresses Possible? 
The real cmx of the first cause argument is the denial of an infinite 
regress of dependent causes of existence. This factor is what forces the con-
clusion to an existent which is not itself the effect of any cause. So if it hlms 
out that the appropriate type of infinite regress is possible there will be no 
inference to a first cause. 
Contingency arguments also depend on a kind of denial of infinite 
regress, namely of sufficient reasons. Here it must be shown that no con-
junction, combination, or set of contingents, even if infinite, would provide 
a tmly and ultimate sufficient reason. 
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Now this is an old objection, often stated simplistically as the obvious 
truth that, since there is an infinity of cardinal numbers, it is easy to con-
ceptualize an infinitely long series of causes, as, for example, in Nielsen 
(1971). 
More recent claims have been more sophisticated, like Mariin (1990) or 
Mackie (1982), and include at least the element of dependent causes. The 
most detailed is Conway (1983). Even Swinbume (1979, 1991) and Davis 
(1997) think that Thomas's argument fails here. It is this "completist falla-
cy" that leads Swinbume to an inductive argument based on Leibniz, rather 
than a deductive one against an infinite regress. 
Frankly, I do not think that any of these have included all of the defini-
tional elements in Thomas's type of series. The classic statement remains 
Brown (1966). Other extensive treatments are in Geisler (1975, 1988) and 
Sadowsky (1980). A brief but excellent discussion is also in Kretzmaml 
(1996). 
They have in common an emphasis on taking all of the factors into 
account, most impOliant perhaps that Thomas and SCOhlS refer to essential-
ly ordered causes of existence, not change, and this makes an enormous dif-
ference. 
This is, no doubt, an objection that needs fmiher detailed treatment. 
Especially Swinbume's challenge needs direct response. While I do not, in 
fact, see anything new there, it may be that fmiher refinement of the argu-
ment is needed. But as it is stated, Swinbume's allegation against Aristotle, 
Thomas, SCOhlS and Hume seems to me to beg the question. It is an empty 
and definitional victory to claim that "full explanations" really are full even 
if some factors included in it, though sufficient, themselves are dependent. 
Again, I am not convinced that there is anything truly new to be said here, 
but further clarificatory work is wananted. 
8. The "What Caused God" Issue 
The insistence on asking the causal question in reference to God comes 
either because of a rejection of all arguments against an infinite regress, as 
discussed above, or on the basis of an overstated causal principle. 
The latter is a simple enor which theists must take care to avoid. One 
cannot affirm simply "everything has a cause" as a premise in the cosmo-
logical argument, only to contradict it by a conclusion affinning something 
which does not have a cause. Mackie (1982) was right to claim that such 
cosmological arguments give us no reason to stop the causal questioning and 
hence they have eliminated a need for God up front. 
This problem deserves little attention, which is what it has been given. 
Koons (1997) notes that by definition necessary beings have no causes. 
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Davis (1997) similarly observes that necessary existence clearly includes 
beginningless existence and hence the question of a cause makes no sense. 
Here I think we clearly have another objection that should be discard-
ed, though not without a caution flag to the theist. 
9 . Necessary Existence Issues 
As we all leamed in our undergraduate history of philosophy class, 
Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason (A 620), reduces the cosmological 
argument to the ontological because of its use of the concept of necessary 
existence. "The concept of necessity," he argued, "is only to be found in our 
reason, as a fonnal condition of thought, it does not allow of being hyposta-
tized as a material condition of existence." 
Flew (1968) notes conectly, I think, that this objection applies only to 
arguments dependent on the principle of sufficient reason and not to the 
Thomistic first cause argument. 
Penelhum (1960) provided a typical version of this objection. Arguing 
that necessary being is defined as self-explanatory, he observes that nothing 
can be explained by reference to itself. Therefore, the very concept is logi-
cally impossible. 
The most careful statement can be found in Smart (1996). He begins by 
distinguishing four meanings of necessary: necessary existence or non-
dependence; logical necessity; physical necessity (boundary conditions); 
and legal necessity, that is, consistency with established laws. Smart argues, 
however, that all four reduce to a first-order logical consistency with con-
textually agreed background assumptions. This is equivalent to inter-
pretability in any non-empty universe. So the kind of necessity for God 
called for in the cosmological argument must be a kind of mathematical 
necessity. Smart thinks that the theist's best bet is to give mathematics a 
Platonic interpretation, despite the fact that its inhlitions do not easily fit cur-
rent epistemology. This, of course, leaves the theist, at best, with a God who 
"exists" in the same way that the number 23 does, which is not likely to give 
much comfort to the theologian. In any case, the only meaning of necessary 
hlms out to be essentially logical and the argument fails to conclude to any-
thing meaningful for the theist. This is the same view Smart presented in his 
essay in the now classic New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955). 
The basic response remains Hick's (1960). Others, like Wainwright 
(1988), Haldane (1996), and Rowe (1975, 1998), have developed similar 
clear concepts of facrual necessity. Swinbume (1979, 1990) argues that 
Kant (et al.) is simply wrong. Fachlal necessity is to be defined in tenns of 
the confonnity of material bodies to laws of nahlre. It is thus a necessity in 
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the things, not a purely conceptual condition, that consists for God in his 
being a te11ninus of explanation. 
This, of course, remains part of a larger discussion about the nature of 
necessity. While I see no convincing argument that necessity can only be the 
logical necessity of propositions, it also seems correct that self-explanation, 
as Penelhum (1960) contends, is contradictory. But the cosmological argu-
ment only needs the concept of a negated contingency: an end to explana-
tion, dependency or causality, itself unexplained. Clearly, work remains on 
this possible objection, but, while it provides some challenge to contingency 
arguments, it seems irrelevant to first cause arguments. 
Smart (1996) admits the coherence of the concept but thinks that such a 
being is not God; it might simply be the universe. That is an objection we 
have dealt with. 
10. Is There a Fallacy of Composition Here? 
In my experience perhaps the most frequent objection to all f011ns of the 
cosmological argument is that they commit the fallacy of composition, that 
is, they attribute to the whole a property of the patis. There are actually two 
allegations here. One is a specific logical blunder some find in Thomas's 
Third Way, the other is a general fault alleged against all contingency argu-
ments; namely that they infer the contingency of the universe as a whole 
from an unvarying contingency of each existent. 
Let me begin with the Third Way. Plantinga (1967) claimed that there 
was a quantifier mistake in Thomas's move from "everything can fail to 
exist at some time" to "everything fails to exist at some time." 
Ross (1980) refers to it as an illegitimate reversal of existential and uni-
versal quantifiers. 
Most often, however, this mistake of Thomas is simply noted as obvi-
ous with little care either to demonstrate precisely what the mistake is or to 
demonstrate by careful exegesis of the text that Thomas actually commits it. 
Martin (1990) is a good example. 
Haldane (1996) and Fogelin (1990) are two recent attempts to exoner-
ate Thomas. Both argue that the appearance of temporality in the Third Way 
is strictly part of the definition of contingency. 
For example, it is impOliant to distinguish Thomas's notion of contingent 
from that of the contemporary modal logician. Thomas's concept has te11ni-
nation or temporal limitation built in. For Haldane, too, the solution lies in 
recognizing that time functions in the Third Way only as pati of the context 
of contingency. Since Thomas's argument is not about temporal succession, 
it cannot be translated or interpreted as implying a point in the past at which 
time nothing existed. This is not a horizontal argument but a vetiical one. So 
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the Third Way simply argues that if truly evetything needs to be caused to 
exist then nothing would exist. While this is not the easiest or most obvious 
reading of Thomas, it certainly fits his pattem more consistently. 
The other locus of an alleged fallacy of composition is in contingency 
arguments that refer to the universe as a whole. Angeles (1974) and Martin 
(1990) are typical examples of recent claims that such cosmological argu-
ments illicitly move from the claim that everything has a cause to the claim 
that the universe has a cause. 
Three points have been made in the recent literature. The first is Davis' 
(1997) reminder that the problem is bypassed by not referring to the universe 
as a whole. None ofthe Thomistic arguments, for example, make this move. 
Second, Miller (1995) points out that the fallacy of composition is an 
info11nal or material fallacy, not a f011nal one. That is, it has to be assessed 
on a case by case basis as noted by Rowe (1962) and Reichenbach (1972). 
The problem here is that no one has identified a decision procedure for dis-
tinguishing appropriate from inappropriate conclusions from parts to whole. 
Think of a picture puzzle in which every piece is triangular. Can one con-
clude that the whole puzzle is triangular? Clearly not. But if each piece is 
red, then surely the whole is red also. But why shape functions differently 
from color, and what a general decision procedure would look like has yet 
to be dete11nined. 
Nevertheless, conclusions from parts to whole clearly are sometimes 
legitimate. Thus one way to defend the cosmological argument is to argue 
that contingency or modality in general operates like color, not shape, as 
Miller (1995), Adler (1980) and others have done. This seems convincing, 
but would celiainly be stronger if a general decision protocol were available. 
A third tactic is to argue directly for the contingency of the whole. 
Koons (1997) for example does so, as does Wainwright (1988). Typically, 
this involves arguing for the need of an explanation that there is a universe 
at all, rather than constructing a conjunction of all of its parts. This bypass-
es Edwards's (1959) now famous Eskimo analogy, and is, in general, a sim-
pler and less vulnerable approach. 
B. New Forms of the Argument 
One of the difficulties in assessing the cosmological argument is that the 
new versions of the argument in the twentieth century have been about as 
frequent as the authors who have written about it. Even those configuring 
specific historical versions have almost invariably, like Mackie (1982) or 
Martin (1990), provided their own restatements of them. Usually, these new 
wordings are attempts to avoid a specific objection or to bring out a patiic-
ular failure. 
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I want here to comment briefly on two recent additions to the discus-
sion. In a way, they represent the cutting edge of the CUlTent debate, with 
celiain new advances and other niceties built in. 
l. Robert Koons' (1997) article in the American Philosophical Quarter(v 
is a good example of using the CUlTent state of developments in logic as well 
as the pitfalls identified in the recent discussion and applying them to the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic argument based on contingency. It reads as follows: 
(1) All the parts of a necessary fact are themselves neceSSaly. 
(2) EvelY contingent fact has a wholly contingent part. 
(3) If there are any contingent facts, C is a wholly contingent fact. 
(4) If there are any contingent facts, C has a cause. 
(5) EvelY contingent fact overlaps C. 
Therefore 
(6): If there are any contingent facts, then C has a cause that is a 
necessary fact. 
This argument works for any contingent facts, even one, such as the 
cosmos, and so bypasses composition issues. It is still susceptible to identi-
fication problems, but Koons includes an excellent development of corollar-
ies that follow the traditional lines. 
The weak points are, first, its use of modalities, but Koons develops a 
standard modal logic supplemented by a calculus of individuals that is hard-
ly controversial. Second, it does assume an equivalent of the denial of an 
infinite regress, in the form of the claim ( or axiom) that any non-empty set 
of facts can be aggregated into a single fact, a totality of all contingent facts. 
Third, it assumes a principle of the universality of causality in order to 
devise (4). Koons argues that it is empirically supported and that its denial 
would be radical skepticism. Thus, it is somewhat vulnerable but along lines 
that have strong support. 
2. Bemard Katz and Elmar Kremer (1997), in Faith alld Philosophy, 
provide a version of Clarke's argument that replaces the principle of suffi-
cient reason with an epistemic principle of explanation. It mns as follows: 
(1) The proposition that there is a unique neceSSalY being who 
brought about the existence of evelything other than itself by 
willing that the other beings should exist, would, if true, 
explain why there are contingent beings. 
(2) There is a possible explanation of the fact that there are con-
tingent beings. 
(3) There is no proposition consistent with the claim that there are 
only contingent beings which, iftme, would explain why there 
are contingent beings. 
(4) Any possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent 
beings entails that there is a neceSSalY being. 
< 
I 
• 
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Therefore 
(5): It is reasonable to believe that there is a neceSSalY being. 
The principle here is PPE: Given that (i) there is a possible explanation 
of the fact that F (here: that there are contingent beings) and (ii) any possi-
ble explanation of the fact that F entails P (here: there is a neceSSalY being), 
it is reasonable to believe that P. 
This argument does, as claimed, have the advantage of not relying on 
any fonn of PSR. It is not neceSSalY to have the argument that all or any 
contingent facts have an explanation, including the fact that there are con-
tingent beings. It only proposes such an explanation. 
As the authors note, this argument fails if there is some tmth that makes 
(1) false. This may be a serious defect, since it may be open to an objection 
like Gale's use of the problem of evil. 
Premise (3) is, in fact, as I see it, a fonn of the denial of infinite regress 
and is open to possible objections from that comer, though this hardly seems 
critical. 
What will need most careful consideration is just how far PPE actually 
gets us. This is a version of a "best possible explanation" argument, and in 
this case not only are there rival candidates, one of them is that there just is 
no explanation. But, of course, in the face of possible explanations it is 
always reasonable to believe that there is one. 
This is not the place for fmiher discussion of this argument, suffice it to 
say that it needs sustained analysis and critique, especially on the use of the 
principle of explanation for a neceSSalY being. 
C. The Significance of the Argument 
Much, I would argue is at stake here. It is not so much that all of 
Christian theology somehow depends solely on the success of the cosmo-
logical argument. Neveliheless, the argument pOlirays the relationship 
between God and evelything else. And there is, I think, a clear sense in 
which if one gets that relationship wrong, there is a great deal else one will 
get wrong, even if one does get the nature of God largely right. Thus, there 
is a good deal of theology and also science, but especially the relationship 
between the two, that is involved. 
It is also the case that the philosophical concepts involved in this argu-
ment are central, basic, and critical. The nature of being, existence, contin-
gency, necessity, propeliies, finite, infinite, causality, explanation, depen-
dence and many others are intricately connected. The fundamental issues in 
metaphysics all playa role in this argument, and it for them. Perhaps, in the 
end, one doesn't understand finite and infinite, for example, until one sees 
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their relatedness in this argument. Thus the argument relates us to meta-
physical issues as well. 
I want only to indicate two matters each in the two areas mentioned 
above and point out why the cosmological argument specifically is so cru-
cial and in which directions I see need for further work. Take this as setting 
an agenda. 
First, the cosmological argument sets parameters and provides basic 
concepts for any theology, especially its doctrine of God. At a time when 
aspects of God's infinity and necessity are in question, the role of this argu-
ment cannot be exaggerated. Catholic philosophers especially have done 
outstanding work here, showing how to derive basic attributes of God from 
the conclusion of the argument. A good recent example is Blandino (1995). 
But for the most part these discussions are heavy with Thomistic language 
and conceptions and not easily translated into CUlTent evangelical jargon, 
and hence have little influence outside their own circles. Some work has 
been done. One of the finest is MOlTis (1991), who develops a "perfect 
being" theology dependent in part on the insights of the cosmological argu-
ment. Other good, though brief discussions are in Koons (1997), Kretzmaml 
(1996), and Kovach (1988). Overall, I think the best thing recently is 
Hughes (1995) book The Nature 0.( God, but it is too philosophically intri-
cate to be readable by most theologians. There is much to do here. 
A second area is the importance of the argument to our understanding 
of science and to the relationship between science and theology. The con-
cept of first cause directly ties the argument to scientific process in ways 
that, if it is true, make it impossible to do science at any level without under-
standing the nature of God. The argument lays out the basis for an under-
standing of both God's action as initiative of all scientific processes and 
events, as well as of how to explain scientific, i.e. causal events as contin-
gent on God. Perhaps most importantly, it tells us how to insist that attribu-
tions to God's activity and to ordinary causal sequences are both true. In 
doing so, it runs counter to contemporary naturalist science but also to the 
strict dichotomies and fideisms fmUld in much of CUlTent evangelical theol-
ogy and practice, especially in the churches, that insist on two kinds of truth: 
religious and scientific. 
Moreland (1989) and Ratzsch (1986) are good examples, but we need 
much more and we need to see applications to specific scientific and ethical 
issues. Much has been done in relation to the teleological argument and it 
needs to be done with the cosmological as well. And it needs to be directed 
both for the larger scientific community and our generally nahiralistic cul-
hIre, as well as for the evangelical lay community. 
Third, and mming to philosophical issues, the cosmological argument is 
important because of its relationship to the other theistic arguments, includ-
ing arguments from experience, joy, need, miracles, and others. Mitchell 
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(1973) and Geivett (1997) have made great contributions by developing the 
notion of a cumulative case, but ever since Kant we have been gun-shy to 
even suggest that there are connections between the arguments. It is not the 
concept of necessary being that is presupposed, and that roots, illegitimate-
ly, all of the arguments. Rather, the conclusion to a first cause in the cos-
mological argument provides the combinative element that allows each 
argument to contribute different components or properties to a united over-
all identity that can reasonably be thought to be God. 
Since one of the 1110St frequent criticisms of each of the arguments sep-
arately is that they do not conclude to something recognizable as God, it is 
clear that we must develop more pariicularly their intelTelatedness. In doing 
so, the cosmological argument is most crucial since it provides the bedrock 
conception of causality or explanation that all others rely on. 
Finally, working with this argument relates one to virmally evelY other 
philosopher because the scope and depth of concepts it involves are so 
extensive. Evelything being done on cause and explanation by philosophers 
of science, on modality by metaphysicians, epistemologists, and logicians, 
on action, on finite/infinite, on propeliies and nahires, and more, has a bear-
ing on this argument, and vice versa. 
So we have an obligation to listen to and be involved in many of these 
conversations. It is possible, after all, that some fomls or even all the cur-
rent ones are beset by some flaws, and some might be fatal. The theist is 
only helped by hunting down bad arguments. Having made much progress 
in rehiming theism to a position of being a reasonable pariner in the larger 
dialogue of philosophy, I urge the members of the Evangelical Philosophical 
Society to continue the Kathairesis, the demolition of arguments, with con-
tinued - even intensified-commitment. 
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